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Introduction to Constraining the
Executive
Tom Campbell*
The essays in this symposium illuminate aspects of the task
of keeping the executive branch within its constitutionally
appointed boundaries. The symposium was conceived before the
2016 elections, so its plan was not directed toward the current
president. Nevertheless, it is inescapable that, writing after those
elections, the authors took recent developments into account.1
The lessons to be learned from these essays, however, have more
permanent application than simply for the immediate present. In
this introduction, I review the articles of the symposium hoping
to highlight the valuable contribution to separation of powers
jurisprudence that each offers for the long term.
This symposium focuses on means of constraining the
executive. There is, of course, a vibrant recent literature on what
constitutes the kind of executive overreach in need of being
constrained.2 This symposium takes as given that there have
been, and will be, instances of executive action or inaction
needing restraint (without becoming embroiled in the specifics
of any specific example), and turns its attention to what
institutional remedies may be available.
A.

Constraining the Executive Through the Courts
The courts are the logical place to seek relief when the
executive’s action needs to be constrained. However, standing
requirements might preclude identifying any plaintiff qualified to
bring a case under Article III’s case or controversy requirement.
* Professor of Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law; Professor of Economics, George L.
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University. I am grateful for expert
research assistance by Ms. Sherry Levsen, J.D., M.L.S., M.A., of the Hugh and Hazel
Darling Law Library, Chapman University.
1 In one instance, that of Levinson and Graber’s article, their entire point of
departure deals with the specifics of President Trump, though they propose a set of
judicial responses that would apply to future presidents with characteristics similar
to his.
2 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously:
The Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199
(2017); contra Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
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Four of the articles in this symposium recommend ways to
expand how cases challenging the president can be brought in
federal court.
1. Professor Randy Beck
Drawing from historical precedent, Professor Randy Beck
proposes a broader use of qui tam actions. Such actions are
already available in American courts under the False Claims
Act.3 Under that approach, when money is owed to the federal
government, and a private party draws that fact to the
executive’s attention but the executive fails to pursue the claim,
the private party can proceed, keeping a portion of any funds
recovered. It is like a whistleblower statute combined with a
finder’s fee.
The qui tam plaintiff has standing because she or he has a
percentage of potential money damages to be gained. A good
example here is the Antideficiency Act, where criminal penalties
can be imposed on an executive officer who spends government
money without authorization.4 If a private citizen uncovers an
unauthorized expenditure of money by an employee of the federal
executive branch, that private citizen can bring a qui tam action
to collect the unauthorized payment back to the federal treasury,
minus a share which the private plaintiff gets to keep.
Elsewhere, I have suggested qui tam as a way to get before a
federal judge the issue of the legality of a war carried on by the
executive without the approval of Congress,5 where money was
spent on expenses of such a war. Beck would allow Congress to
go even further. In connection with any specific duty or
prohibition imposed on the executive by statute, Congress could
add a penalty provision, owed to the U.S. Treasury, by an
executive officer who fails in her or his duty. Beck would thus
allow Congress to legislate private standing in almost any
context it might wish to constrain the executive through the
simple expedient of specifying a sum of money an executive agent
would owe the government, if found to be deficient in her or his
duties under that statute. The qui tam plaintiff would thus
distinguish herself or himself from the large mass of citizens by
her or his interest in a share of that sum.
I see no fault with the logic that this creates a case or
controversy regarding the qui tam claimant that sets her or him
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
See 31 U.S.C. § 1518 (removal from office); § 1519 (fine and imprisonment);
§ 1341 (predicate).
5 Tom Campbell, Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 585 (2017).
3
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apart from the average citizen. Unlike qui tam actions under the
False Claims Act, however, Beck’s expanded recourse to qui tam
does not start with a pre-existing sum of money which is, by
hypothesis, owed to the government. That “res” constitutes the
case or controversy for Article III purposes.6 The qui tam statute
merely expands the number of persons with a specific interest in
that “res.” Can Congress both create the “res” and the class of
persons with a specific interest in it? Beck maintains from
historical precedent that this can be done, and was done, often, in
British jurisprudence, going back to the fourteenth century. He
maintains that several American states have done the same,
including when they were colonies. Legislatures essentially
harnessed private energies to enforce duties on public officials by
imposing a fine on failure to fulfill such duties and letting the
private party share in the fine.
Beck realizes other jurisprudential doctrines, especially the
political question doctrine, might yet shield executive action or
inaction from judicial scrutiny. He also perceives a danger in
over-zealous use of the device he is advancing: executive agents
might be chilled in the conscientious performance of their duty by
the risk of personal liability. That risk, presumably, would be
taken into account as Congress decided the set of executive
actions or inactions in regard to which the expanded qui tam
claims could be brought. Beck suggests three, from recent public
events: waging war without Congressional authorization, failing
to preserve government emails as government records, and not
spending money the Congress has appropriated.
Is there a limit to what Beck proposes? At what point would
the Supreme Court say Congress could not create standing where
none existed before just by monetizing an executive duty? How to
articulate a constraining principle is the weakness in Beck’s
proposal—though one might view it as a strength, in that no
action of the executive would be able to evade judicial review (at
least on standing grounds) when the Congress put its mind to so
subjecting it.7
2. Professors Andrew Hessick and William Marshall
Professors Andrew Hessick and William Marshall also seek
to constrain the executive by greater access to the judicial
6 See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (referring to the
focus of the False Claims Act on a financial loss to the government).
7 Of course, any Congressional bill creating the qui tam action might be vetoed, so
Beck’s remedy would require a two-thirds consensus of both houses of Congress. While
not a constraining substantive principle, that does constitute a practical constraint on
over-use of Beck’s imaginative idea.
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branch. In their article, they recommend easier standing
requirements for states as plaintiffs. They view litigation of the
type brought by twenty-six states against President Obama’s
“Deferred Action for Parents of Americans” (“DAPA”) as a
salubrious mechanism for checking executive authority (in that
case, executive inaction)—whether a court ends up siding with
the president or not.
States as plaintiffs hold advantages over Congress, in
Hessick and Marshall’s view, because Congress has declined
markedly in its vigorous vindication of legislative prerogatives,
becoming instead an instrument of partisanship.8 A Republican
Congress will challenge a Democratic president, but not a
Republican one, and vice versa. Of course, the same could be said
of state attorneys general and governors, so Hessick and
Marshall suggest a form of discretion in judicial rulings on
standing that would incorporate whether a bipartisan mix of
states’ governors or attorneys general were bringing the suit. If
such a group of states brings suit, then Hessick and Marshall
would ease the standing requirement of “injury in fact” to allow a
more speculative kind of injury to be pled, as in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency,9 a case where, they maintain,
a private party’s fear of rising sea levels from global warming
would have been insufficient to establish standing.
Are Hessick and Marshall justified in claiming that states
have a unique kind of interest, deserving relaxed standing
requirements? They recognize the sovereign interest of states to
oppose being turned into instruments of the federal government.
That was the situation in one part of the challenge to the
Affordable Care Act/Obamacare (“ACA”) that prevailed before the
Supreme Court.10 There is also the non-sovereign interest that
the states have in suing on behalf of their citizens for their
citizens’ harm, in parens patriae actions.11 What they see in
addition to these established forms of standing is the states’
interest in constraining any federal action (not just presidential
action) because federal action will preempt state authority.12
8 For an in-depth development of the same theme, see Edward G. Carmines
& Matthew Fowler, The Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased Polarization
and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the Expansion of Presidential
Power, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369 (2017).
9 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (West 2018).
12 In Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L.
REV. 201 (2017), Professor Nash explores the concept of a state having special standing
when the federal government has legislatively preempted a subject area, but then the
federal executive fails to vindicate that interest. Hessick and Marshall’s insight is a
similar one.
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They note states have a legitimacy that private parties do not
because of democratic accountability; and they further applaud
the development of expertise and judgment from the recurring
nature of this kind of litigation involving state actors, as opposed
to any private party in a given case.
Yet the same might be said of Congress. Any upholding of
presidential action in an area of shared authority cuts back what
Congress could do absent the president’s action. That affects
Congressional prerogatives as much as upholding a presidential
action in an area of potential state authority does the state’s
prerogatives. If getting many states on board confers legitimacy,
so also might legitimacy be found for a suit by a house of
Congress not brought just by a few members, but sanctioned by a
resolution from the house of Congress bringing the lawsuit, as
occurred in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell (originally
filed as Boehner v. Burwell) (challenging the payments to insurance
companies under ACA as not having been appropriated).13
Also similar to Hessick and Marshall’s argument for the
states as parties, the House or Senate, too, will develop expertise
over the years, if permitted standing to challenge executive
authority. Hessick and Marshall’s preference for empowering
states, rather than Congress, to sue the executive, thus comes
down to a reluctance to weigh in on the side of Congress in
balance of powers issues, and a correlative willingness to weigh
in on the side of states in federalism issues, at least where the
group of states presenting the challenge is bipartisan.
For many years, the D.C. Circuit applied a doctrine of
equitable discretion to allow suits by members of Congress in
some circumstances.14 Raines v. Byrd appeared to end that route
for Congressional standing,15 but the Court recently opened a
new avenue for state legislators to sue agencies of state
government in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, 16 distinguishing suits by state
legislatures from those by Congress.17 The Court identified the
same concern based on separation of powers that Hessick and
13 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169
(D.D.C. 2016).
14 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Riegle
v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 880–81 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied,
454 U.S. 1082 (1981); see also Sophia C. Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss
Congressional-Plaintiff Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075 (1990).
15 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818–29 (1997).
16 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
17 Id. at 2665 n.12. Regarding the revived standing of states to sue the federal
executive for violations of federal legislative prerogatives, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New Process Federalism,” 105 CAL.
L. REV. 1739, 1745–50 (2017).
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Marshall did about Congressional recourse to the courts, but
noted the absence of such a concern when the state legislature
was suing a state agency.18 The defendant was a state agency,
not the federal executive, in Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission. Hence, the Court’s explicit distinction between state
legislatures and Congress as plaintiffs might presage the Court’s
willingness to take exactly the course that Hessick and Marshall
advocate, and allow greater standing to states as plaintiffs
to invoke the third federal branch to constrain the second
federal branch.
3. Professor Michael Ramsey
Professor Michael Ramsey finds new hope for constraining
the executive through litigation where the subject is foreign
affairs because of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Zivotofsky
v. Kerry.19 Ramsey points out how the Zivotofsky decision
restricts the political question doctrine as announced in Baker v.
Carr,20 cutting back Baker’s six criteria to only two: (1) whether
the issue was textually committed to another branch of
government, and (2) whether manageable standards were
available for the court to make a judgment. Eliminating the more
open-ended of Baker’s criteria makes it more difficult for a court
to cite the political question doctrine. In Ramsey’s view, future
challenges to executive action in foreign affairs, including the
exercise of war powers, would be justiciable insofar as they call
on a court to interpret the meaning of a statute or a clause of the
Constitution.21 If a litigant asks a court to make a factual
judgment, however, especially one calling into question whether a
presidential decision was justified, the political question doctrine
would remain.
Id. at 2665 n.12.
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
21 Professor Julian Mortenson also sees increased likelihood for successful challenges
of presidential action in foreign affairs as a result of Zivotofsky, but for substantive
reasons in the opinion itself. See Julian Mortenson, Zivotofsky: The Difference Between
Inherent and Exclusive Presidential Power, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 45 (2017).
“It is not for the president alone to determine the whole content of the nation’s
foreign policy. That said, it is for the president alone to make the specific
decision of which foreign power he will recognize as legitimate.” Besides taking
every opportunity to emphasize the narrowness of its holding, the majority
seems repeatedly to go out of its way to celebrate the role of the legislature:
“[W]hether the realm is foreign or domestic,” the opinion urges over and over
again, “it is still the Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes
the law.” There is reason for more than a little suspicion that Marbury-style jiu
jitsu may be at work here: this decision reaches a pro-executive outcome, but
does so through the creation of a vehicle whose analytical structure and overall
atmosphere is strikingly pro-congressional.
Id. at 48–49 (footnotes omitted).
18
19
20
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Ramsey cannot point to any post-Zivotofsky case where a
court abandoned the political question doctrine, but he does
successfully identify how lower courts have, in writing their
opinions, trimmed their reliance on the doctrine because of the
Zivotofsky formulation. Ramsey also very helpfully traces the
history of the political question back to Marbury v. Madison,22
through later decisions of the Marshall Court, and the Civil War
Prize Cases,23 to demonstrate that Baker’s restrictive formulation
of the political question doctrine was more of an aberration than
a continuation of settled jurisprudence. (To this, I would add that
Justice Brennan’s announcement of six principles for the political
question doctrine in Baker was actually obiter dicta: the Court
held the doctrine did not apply to that case, so what was said
about when it might apply does not qualify as a holding.)
If Professor Ramsey is correct, perhaps the most important
consequence is that Zivotofsky will have opened up the courts to
deciding whether the War Powers Resolution24 is constitutional.25
That is a profoundly important question that has eluded judicial
resolution for forty-five years. Such a question would fit
Ramsey’s formulation: it would not require analysis of the facts
of any particular conflict. Rather, the two fundamental
challenges to its constitutionality would be answered as matters
of constitutional law: (1) can the president’s use of force be
restricted to sixty days absent an affirmative vote of Congress;
and (2) can Congress delegate to the president its right to choose
against whom to wage war for sixty days?
Academics, legislative leaders, and average citizens can only
hope that Professor Ramsey’s prediction does prove true, and
that members of the third branch take up the invitation to
constrain the executive in the foreign affairs area, in those
instances where a pure question of constitutional law or
statutory interpretation is required.
4. Professors Sanford Levinson and Mark Graber
Professors Levinson and Graber make a tremendously
original contribution to the academic literature on judicial review
of executive action with their submission to this symposium.26
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803).
The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
24 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48.
25 See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 45.
26 The only recent treatment I have seen that deals with some of these same issues is
Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 71 (2017). Professor Shaw largely opposes judicial cognizance of presidential
speeches; while Professors Levinson and Graber base much of their argument for
heightened scrutiny of President Trump on his speeches and other public
22
23
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The entire U.S. constitutional scheme for executive authority
rests, in their view, on a conception of the president as minimally
qualified, not subject to conflicts of interest, and not emotionally
immature. When a president lacks these qualities, specific rules
of judicial deference to the executive, and justiciability
constraints on suits against him, should no longer apply.
Professors Levinson and Graber maintain President Trump
does lack these qualities. Accordingly, courts should approach
challenges to his actions with the following presumptions.
Wholesale delegations of power from Congress to the president in
legislation passed in an earlier era should be narrowly
interpreted now, and explicit grants of authority should
be required rather than allowed to be inferred. The kind of
motive-analysis with which the Supreme Court approached the
actions of southern legislatures in the civil rights era, but not in
other contexts, should be revived regarding President Trump.
Levinson and Graber invite federal courts to make use of
President Trump’s campaign (and some subsequent) statements
as to his own (possibly unconstitutional) motivations. They also
encourage federal courts to accept full constitutional challenges,
facial and as-applied, to actions by President Trump. They urge a
narrowing of the constitutional avoidance maxim, because the
premise that a co-equal branch did not intend to violate the
Constitution is not true in the case of President Trump.27
Their article focuses entirely on how courts should entertain
challenges to a president who is anti-Publian: that is, lacking the
virtues that Publius, the pseudonymous author of the Federalist
Papers, assumed a president would possess. Professors Levinson
and Graber’s guiding principle in recommending this approach is
that the Constitution has given way to exceptional powers
granted to the president in some contexts (war and other
national emergency), and to great skepticism of federalism in the
face of overt racial motivation for states’ actions. So, why in the
present context of a president less qualified than any in history,
and who has in his own statements evidenced prejudice often and
clearly, they ask, should we not also see a tailoring of judicial
doctrines developed in more normal circumstances?

pronouncements. However, Professor Shaw departs from her overall premise in her
section “Presidential Speech as Evidence of (Constitutionally Forbidden) Government
Purpose,” id. at 137–40, which is where Professors Levinson and Graber have put most of
their focus.
27 For a similar skepticism of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, see Aneil
Kovvali, Constitutional Avoidance and Presidential Power, 35 YALE J. REG. BULL.
10 (2017).
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It is true that the Supreme Court has evaluated motive in
striking down state governmental action neutral on its face, but
with a racially discriminatory effect.28 The normal deference
owed to a state legislature was suspended when the assumption
of their action in good faith was cast into serious doubt. Levinson
and Graber point to New York Times v. Sullivan29 as a case
abandoning centuries of libel and slander law to create a
protection for the press unique in world jurisprudence, all driven
by the specific circumstances of the civil rights era. So also,
Professors Levinson and Graber argue, we might normally expect
a court to ignore campaign rhetoric by a candidate in evaluating
that candidate’s actions once in office, and even accord some
deference to a plausibly constitutional motivation for official
action (as in the constitutional avoidance maxim for legislative
acts). They argue we should not do so, however, in the case of
President Donald Trump, whose campaign (and subsequent)
statements of an anti-immigrant nature, for example, corrupted
his various travel-bans, thus providing a legitimate basis for
overruling them, even though a court might have allowed an
identical executive order to go into effect from a president not so
tainted. This, of course, was the rationale of the Fourth Circuit in
overturning President Trump’s exclusion orders for immigrants
from select countries he claimed had imposed inadequate vetting,
but which the court held were selected because of their
Muslim populations.30
Professors Levinson and Graber’s suggestions deal with the
doctrines of justiciability developed under the rubric of judicial
prudence, not constitutional requirement. Adopting what the
Professors argue, therefore, would violate no constitutional
provision. As noted above, years ago, the D.C. Circuit developed a
doctrine of “equitable discretion” for deciding when to grant
standing to members of Congress to challenge presidential acts.31
The approach advanced by Professors Levinson and Graber
should be seen as no more controversial than that.
What is more difficult, however, is to determine “neutral
principles”32 for deciding when a president is non-Publian.
President Donald Trump qualifies for so many reasons, in the
Professors’ view, the conclusion is, in mathematical terms,
28 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 340, 340 (1960) (enjoining action by the
Alabama legislature to redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee so as to eliminate almost all
black residents).
29 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2017).
31 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
32 Levinson and Graber’s point of departure in their article is Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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“overdetermined.” It is not entirely clear which characteristics
they would consider sufficient. Among the determinants they
cite are President Trump not having won a majority of the
popular vote, his being roundly criticized as incompetent by other
office-holders, silence of other office-holders who might have been
expected to defend him, his business conflicts of interest, his
crude speech especially on matters of race, his many factual
misstatements, his seeming inability to admit an error, the
manifest absence of any previous qualifying experience, and his
many changes of position, even within the same day.
Professors Levinson and Graber analogize treating a
non-Publian president differently from a “normal” president to
reforming a contract in the face of mutual mistake, improvising
dialogue in a theater piece when an actor forgets a line, or
running a different sports play when the originally planned move
becomes impossible. In each such case, however, the parties act
to re-establish what would have been done had they known a fact
at the start that only became apparent subsequently. That is not
the case with President Trump. Most, if not all, of the flaws
identified were well known from the campaign. This is more a
case of buyers’ remorse than mutual mistake. Indeed, President
Trump would maintain there was no mistake at all.
A suggestion I offer is that the decision to treat a president
as Publian or not should not be binary.33 Rather, I would suggest
that courts adopt a sliding scale, opting for higher scrutiny of
presidential action the more non-Publian the president may be.
This approach would allow for different decisions in different
contexts: in the instance of President Trump, his statements
about the federal judge being ineligible to decide the case
involving Trump University because of his parents’ Mexican
heritage might serve to justify a non-Publian conclusion in a
matter involving immigration, but not, necessarily, in a matter
of imposing offsetting tariffs for perceived trade violations by
other nations.
The Supreme Court will soon have the occasion to consider
the Levinson-Graber suggestion when it rules on President
Trump’s travel bans. Professors Levinson and Graber have
served up to the Court a rationale for taking into account the
33 Professors Levinson and Graber identify several other presidents whose
qualifications for president were minimal, but whom they would not consider
non-Publian. As a humbling note to this exercise, I might add to the presidents they
suggest, the case of our country’s greatest president, a one-term Congressman from
Illinois (though he had experience in the part-time state legislature), who never won a
majority of the popular vote, and whom the intelligent critics at the time considered
uneducated and uneducable.
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very specific facts of this president’s behavior, qualifications, and
public statements, should the Court be inclined to do so.
B.

Constraining the Executive by the Executive?

1. Professor Gary Lawson
In his article in this symposium, Professor Lawson suggests
that an effort to constrain the executive might be launched from
an entirely different source: the executive itself, and, especially,
President Trump himself. Structurally, of course, Professor
Lawson is right. A president devoted to limiting executive power
can go far to effectuating that result. Lawson identifies several
ways: vetoing laws that grant more power from Congress to the
executive branch, proposing the repeal of existing laws that grant
such delegations, failing to use the authority that has already
been delegated, and appointing federal judges who will revive the
nondelegation doctrine and otherwise return the executive
branch to the limits Lawson believes the Framers intended.
Lawson concedes the attraction of using executive power for
“good ends” might overcome these self-constraining instincts of a
president. President Obama’s approach to immigration reform is
a good example. President Obama wanted to grant protected
status to two large categories of individuals who had entered
America illegally, but withheld doing so for almost six years,
saying “for me to simply through executive order ignore those
congressional mandates would not conform with my appropriate
role as President.”34 Eventually, his desire for the policy
outcome overcame his reservations about whether he had
the constitutional authority to allow those groups of immigrants
to stay.
To have lasting effect, as the President Obama precedent
just cited shows, President Trump would have to do more than
simply implement his own preferred approach to administrative
law. He has ordered his executive branch agencies to repeal two
regulations for every one new regulation desired; but a new
president could reverse that instantaneously.
The ACA individual mandate has now been repealed,
thereby cutting back a huge grant of authority to the Secretary of
U.S. Health and Human Services to specify what elements had to
be in anyone’s health insurance. The next target of the Trump
34 United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 783 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Univision Town Hall,
(Mar. 28, 2011, 10:37 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/
03/28/remarks-president-univision-town-hall [http://perma.cc/2APS-LQR5]).
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administration has already been identified: the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank
legislation, with sweeping authority to outlaw “unfair” financial
practices, and protected from the Congressional oversight
afforded by the appropriation process by reason of being funded
directly by the Federal Reserve.
For President Trump to fulfill his promise as Professor
Lawson sees it, Trump would have to urge the repeal of more
than just the ACA and Dodd-Frank. He would have to get
Congress to cut back the very broad delegations of power to the
executive enshrined in statutes such as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, with its prohibition of “unfair methods of
competition,”35 and the Securities Exchange Act, whose section
78j allows the Securities Exchange Commission to promulgate
any regulations “necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.”36 Such a major step would
require Congressional majorities supporting President Trump
much larger than he now possesses and a systemic review of the
statutory underpinnings of the administrative state that has not
yet even been commenced.
The way President Trump might come close to achieving the
potential Lawson sees for him is more likely in his judicial
appointments. Professor Lawson notes that Justice Gorsuch
brings an interest in reviving the non-delegation doctrine to the
Supreme Court, far beyond any such disposition by Justice Scalia
whom he replaced. If future appointments to the Supreme Court
and the D.C. Circuit reflect a zealous focus on restoring the
non-delegation doctrine (as opposed to simply a commitment to
judicial conservatism), President Trump will have constrained
the executive more powerfully, and more permanently, than any
of the other mechanisms discussed in this symposium. In
Professor Lawson’s Monty Python lexicon, that would be
“something completely different.”
2. Mr. Paul Baumgardner
Mr. Paul Baumgardner enlivens our symposium with one
particular area to constrain the executive. Claiming to be neutral
as to the policy, he nevertheless sets forth the arguments against
the propriety of presidents issuing Thanksgiving Proclamations.
A Jeffersonian respect for the wall of separation between church
and state should inhibit presidents from this practice, he
maintains, even in the absence of any such proclamation’s calling
35
36

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
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on citizens to undertake particular religious acts or prayers, such
as thanking God.
Baumgardner does not provide any constraining principle, so
that his arguments would apply just as well to a presidential
speech as to a Thanksgiving Proclamation. If that suggestion
were followed, I personally would have deep regret. Perhaps the
finest Inaugural Address in history, Lincoln’s Second Inaugural,
places the Civil War squarely in the tradition of a vengeful God’s
punishment to North and South alike for the offenses of slavery,
which both parts of the nation tolerated, promoted, and from
which they both derived benefit. Here is the soaring rhetoric
that, under Baumgardner’s sources and reasoning, should never
have been spoken in March of 1865:
Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes
His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should
dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the
sweat of other men’s faces, but let us judge not, that we be not judged.
The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been
answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. “Woe unto the
world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but
woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.” If we shall suppose
that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued
through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He
gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to
those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any
departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living
God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray,
that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God
wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another
drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still
it must be said “the judgments of the Lord are true and
righteous altogether.”37

Since Baumgardner’s analysis is directed at presidential
speech and not executive actions or regulations, I cannot see how
his analysis can be made to have force—except by convincing
individual presidents to self-censor. As a personal preference, I
would not deprive our nation of the treasure of Lincoln’s Second
Inaugural Address. As a constitutional matter, Baumgardner
does not grapple with the president’s own First Amendment right
to speak, or freely to exercise his religion. Nor, extrapolating his
arguments to apply to Congressional speech invoking God, does
37 President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, BARTLEBY (Mar. 4, 1865),
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html [http://perma.cc/2SR6-CL3H].
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his logic address the provision that any speech made in Congress
not be “questioned in any other place.” These are also parts of the
Constitution and need to be read in conjunction with, not to be
decimated by, the Establishment Clause.
As a thought piece, Baumgardner’s article provides a caution
to politicians who might exploit religion, but that assumes that
kind of politician is subject to shaming. I personally believe there
is a place for religion in public discourse, short of exploitation,
and it would be a great loss to see it end.
C.

Against Expanded Constraint of the Executive

1. Professor Neal Devins
Professor Neal Devins describes an almost apocalyptically
partisan world in Congress, from which situation he derives the
conclusion that courts should be even more reluctant to hear
lawsuits brought by legislators against executive overreach than
they have hitherto.38 Relying on impressive original research,
Devins details the demise of the institutionalists in Congress:
House members and Senators who would stand up for the
authority of Congress even against a president of their own
party. Now, Devins sees an urban battle zone pockmarked by
hollowed out buildings that once stood for institutional
principles, destroyed by their use as targets and weapons in an
unceasing partisan divide.
He is largely right. Bipartisanship seems reserved for former
Congress members,39 and several current Senators who have
formed the Common Sense Caucus,40 dedicated to overcoming the
partisanship that has stymied legislative progress on America’s
most pressing needs. However, the former group is significant for
many members who found bi-partisanship only after leaving
Congress; and the latter group, while productive in ending the
first government shutdown of 2018, has yet to fulfill its promise
as the critical mass able to move between the two parties to
create a transitory majority of sixty Senators able to overcome
filibuster by Democrats, and ideological purity from the
38 Professor Devins is not unique in his pessimistic description of the decline of
Congress’s ability and willingness to assert its institutional interests in a bipartisan way.
See, e.g., David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33–37 (2018).
39 Over 180 former Members of Congress have formed the “ReFormers Caucus.” See
ReFormers Caucus Members, ISSUE ONE, https://www.issueone.org/reformers/#reformerfull-list [http://perma.cc/BW74-23XH]. Just over one hundred are Democrats, and over
eighty are Republicans. See id.
40 See Alex Swoyer & David Sherfinski, Centrist senators form Common Sense
Caucus, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/23/
centrist-senators-form-common-sense-caucus/ [http://perma.cc/LNA2-MJHA].
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Republicans. For all the reasons Professor Devins laments, we
should wish these efforts well; but he’s right, their prospects for
success are bleak.
We are left with a dysfunctional Congress, incapable of
standing up for its institutional privileges against an expanding
executive. Professor Devins worries that allowing more legislators’
lawsuits will create a new forum for the partisan divide, and may,
therefore, paint the courts also with a more partisan cast. This
leaves Professor Devins with no specific remedy for the problem he
has chronicled: an institutional lassitude by Congress in the face
of executive branch encroachments.
Professor Devins and I respectfully disagree on the value of
expanded legislator standing.41 The value served by allowing
legislators to sue the executive is not in the unique insight of the
legislators’ legal arguments, but in the fact that in many cases
they may be the only parties with standing to challenge executive
actions. I trust courts to cut through the partisan nature of
arguments submitted in briefs by members of one party in the
House or Senate. What those members do, however, in getting a
case to court could be irreplaceable.
Consider, for instance, an executive’s failure to enforce laws:
whether President Obama on immigration, or President Trump
on the ACA tax. What private party would have standing to force
a president to act?42 Or consider the challenge to a president
spending money that was not the subject of an appropriation, as
the U.S. Constitution requires?43 If a group of members of
Congress, even though entirely partisan, nevertheless are held to
have standing (as, for instance, the House did in U.S. House of
Representatives v. Burwell44), and no one else conceivably could,
then I would weather the risk that a judge would be drawn into a
partisan dispute, in order to get the issue resolved. The political
question doctrine would still be available for the judge to avoid
ruling if there were too great a partisan divisive risk in doing so.
2. Professor John Yoo
Professor John Yoo presents a contrast to the majority of
participants in this symposium by a robust defense of executive
See generally Campbell, supra note 5.
I grant that it is still not clear that even members of Congress would have
standing in such situations, but their institutional interest in seeing laws passed by
Congress be enforced is of a different kind than that of the average citizen. That is the
gist of my article. See generally Campbell, supra note 5.
43 “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
44 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 76
(D.D.C. 2015).
41
42
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action, occasionally even beyond legal limits. He provides an
exhaustive, insightful, and largely laudatory recounting of the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, as analyzed in domestic
policy, foreign policy, and civil liberties. Yoo sees the success of
FDR’s four terms in office as the direct result of FDR’s
willingness to stretch the powers of the presidency to the utmost.
In the area of domestic policy, Yoo candidly observes with
historical hindsight that the New Deal, and tight monetary
policy, prolonged rather than alleviated the Great Depression. He
criticizes the expansion of the administrative state, whereby
FDR’s legacy of federal agencies, excessive delegation of power
from Congress, and truncating state’s reserved powers continues
to have effects to this day—not all bad, but mostly so.
Yet in foreign affairs, and civil liberties, Yoo finds
redemption for FDR’s robust assertion of executive authority. Yoo
maintains that if the president abided by the spirit (and the
letter) of Congressional enactments consistent with the nation’s
preference for neutrality, America might never have helped
Britain at the time of Britain’s greatest need, and might have
entered the European theater of war too late, if at all.
The wartime civil liberties restrictions, including massive
wiretapping without warrants, are similarly justified, in
Professor Yoo’s view, by their results: An America largely
protected from enemy sabotage throughout World War II.
One might put Yoo’s position this way: Of what use is the
separation of powers, the rule of law, and the Bill of Rights in
America in a world where Nazism and fascism had triumphed in
Europe and intimidated the United States into the status of a
vassal state? This is a variant of Justice Jackson’s argument,
dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago, that our U.S. Constitution
is not a “suicide pact.”45 The argument is that courts must not
ignore what is necessary to protect our country’s very existence
by an overly scrupulous regard for civil liberties or restrictions on
executive action more suited to normal times. Professor Yoo is in
this camp, in my view. He has good company; Justice Jackson
knew what he was talking about, having just returned from his
role as prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials. Terminiello dealt

45 “There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
Linda Greenhouse, The Nation; ‘Suicide Pact,’ N.Y. T IMES (Sept. 22, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/22/weekinreview/the-nation-suicide-pact.html
(discussing other appearances of this or similar phrases in Supreme Court opinions).
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with incitements to a mob, and Jackson detailed in his opinion
how manipulation of mobs had allowed Hitler to come to power.
Nevertheless, if we dull our sensitivity to violations of civil
liberties and to encroachments by the executive upon the people’s
representatives in the legislative branch, I believe we run
another risk of losing our identity as a constitutional democratic
republic of limited government powers and maximum individual
freedom. We have already seen these tendencies developing
rapidly in our “war on terror,” with unprecedented incursions
into individual liberties under the Patriot Act, and reliance on ex
parte judicial proceedings (like the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court) to issue search warrants and wiretaps that
sweep up information about innocent Americans along with
foreign suspects.
Undoubtedly, presidents like FDR (and Lincoln) exceeded
the boundaries of executive authority. Undoubtedly, they are also
two of the most beloved presidents in our country’s history. Both
saved our country.
Perhaps we have, tacitly, become the Roman Republic:
allocating exceptional powers to Consuls in time of great crisis.
The Roman Republic set a strict time limit for their Consuls,
with authority automatically reverting to the Senate when the
time ran out. That historical precedent, however, is not a
comforting one. The Roman Republic grew used to autocracy. The
security and welfare offered by those given dictatorial power
were favored by the people over their own freedom. The Consul
became the Emperor, and the days of Rome as a republic came to
an end.
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